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§1. Introduction 
Immanuel Kant is known as an ardent defender of the moral equality and inviolable 
dignity of all humans. Yet he also contended that men are naturally superior to women 
and—for much of his life—that “whites” are naturally superior to other “races.” On 
these grounds, he defended the rule of men over women and—again for much of his 
life—the rule of whites over the rest of the world. 
 Kant is no exception in having held sexist and racist views, and we should not 
regard his views as a matter of merely contingent personal prejudice. Sexism and 
racism were endemic features of the Western philosophical discourse of his era and of 
the belief systems, social practices, and political institutions that form the historical 
context of this discourse. 
Kant’s case is especially poignant, however. He is one of the greatest 
philosophers of all time, he was able to break with received opinions on many other 
issues, and he formulated egalitarian moral principles that he claimed to be valid for 
all human beings—and indeed more broadly still, for all rational beings. Yet he long 
defended European colonial rule over the rest of the world and the enslavement, by 
“whites,” of those he racialized as being “yellow,” “black,” “copper-red,” and “mixed”-
race. Late in life, around his 70th birthday, Kant dropped the thesis of racial hierarchy 
and began to criticize European colonialism, but he never made parallel revisions to 
his account of the status of women. 
 Many moral theorists have been inspired by Kant’s conception of human 
dignity, equality, and the duty of respect. Many also believe that the moral principles 
Kant articulated can be used precisely to show what is wrong with racism and sexism. 
But is it possible to do so when we know that Kant himself endorsed racist and sexist 
views during the very years in which he formulated his egalitarian moral principles? 
SGIR Review                                                                          Volume 2, Issue 2 ⧟ Fall 2019 
4 
Can we separate the principles from the objectionable views and use Kant’s principles 
to criticize his own biases? These are the questions at issue in this essay.1  
I first provide a brief description of Kant’s view on sexual and racial hierarchies, 
and of the way they intersect (§2). I then move to the question whether we should 
‘remove and set aside’ Kant’s sexism and racism or ‘translate’ his egalitarian principles 
into inegalitarian ones, and I advocate a third position (§3). In §4 I argue that the use 
of inclusive language and female pronouns, in discussions of Kant’s moral and political 
philosophy, carries significant risks. I conclude by proposing preconditions for 
fruitfully using Kant’s principles to criticize sexism and racism. 
 
§2. Kant on the Sexes and the Races 
In the 1780s, the decade of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant defended the view that there 
is a sexual and racial hierarchy that justifies the subjection of women to men and of 
non-whites to whites. In the subsequent decade, he gave up his commitment to the 
racial hierarchy but not to the sexual hierarchy. I will present his views only briefly 
here, since my interest in this paper lies in the follow-up questions they raise.2 
 
§2.1. Sexual Difference and Sexual Hierarchy 
From his early pre-critical writings to his last publications, Kant described women as 
having very different characteristics than men—characteristics that bear directly on 
moral agency. In a long chapter on the “contrast” between the sexes, in the early 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), Kant writes:  
 
                                               
1 In this essay, I focus only on racism and sexism in Kant’s work because these are the focus of this 
special issue of SGIR Review. Many of the arguments developed in this essay can be extended to other 
aspects of Kant’s work and to the work of other figures in the history of philosophy. I thank Gerad Gentry 
for inviting me to write this paper in which I combine, further elaborate, and extend several arguments 
originally introduced in separate contexts. I thank him for organizing the panel at the 2019 Eastern APA 
where this paper was first presented, and I am also grateful to the audience at that session, as well as to 
Elvira Basevich, Carolyn Benson, Michael Gregory, Suzanne Jacobi, Marijana Vujosevic, and Lieuwe 
Zijlstra for helpful comments. 
2 I have discussed Kant’s views on race and gender in more detail in Kleingeld, 1993, 2007, and 2014, 
and I draw on these papers in this section. 
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The virtue of the woman is a beautiful virtue. That of the male sex ought to be 
a noble virtue. Women will avoid evil not because it is unjust but because it is 
ugly, and for them virtuous actions mean those that are morally beautiful 
[sittlich schön]. Nothing of ought, nothing of must, nothing of obligation. … 
They do something only because they love to, and the art lies in making sure 
that they love only what is good. I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of 
principles, and I hope not to give offense by this, for these are also extremely 
rare among the male sex. (OFBS 2:231–232) 
 
Of course, Kant’s gallant ending in this passage does not diminish the gravity of his 
characterization of women as unreceptive to moral obligation and that of men as 
having to master the art of directing women toward the good. Nor does Kant’s claim 
that these sexual differences have been arranged wisely by “Nature” or “Providence” 
make this sound any better (OFBS 2:228–243).  
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), one of Kant’s last 
publications, he continues to distinguish between “feminine” and “masculine” virtue, 
asserting that each has a different “incentive,” that women have “their own vocation,” 
and that this is all part of a grand providential scheme (A 7:303-311). 
When two people unite, Kant writes with reference to marriage, one must be 
subordinate to the other. Nature has made men superior to women in strength and 
courage, whereas women are naturally fearful, and this gives men the right to 
command. Women, by contrast, are superior to men in being able to conquer the 
inclination of the other sex toward them. As if this was not already damning with faint 
praise, Kant adds that men gladly submit to their wives’ regimes so as to be able to go 
about their own business (A 7:303–304). 
In his legal and political philosophy, Kant never criticizes the legal tutelage of 
women; indeed, he justifies it explicitly by reference to male superiority. In the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant asserts that the only “human right” is the “innate right 
to freedom” that “belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity.” He further 
explicates this as a right to freedom, equality, and independence (including the right 
to be one’s own master [Herr], MM 6:237). Yet Kant also argues that the “natural 
superiority” of men gives a husband the right to command over his wife as her master 
(Herr) (MM 6:279; cp. A 7:209). Further, he classifies “all women” as “passive 
citizens,” that is, as lacking civil independence and the right to vote. Dependent men 
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(such as domestic servants) are also passive citizens, but Kant explicitly states that 
they should always have the option of working their way up to active citizenship (MM 
6:314–315). Nowhere does Kant condemn the subordinate legal and political status of 
women or call for their emancipation. 
Kant shows some awareness of the tensions in his own account. He feels the 
need to declare that the characteristics of women and their subordinate status do not 
run counter to the fundamental equality of men and women (MM 6:279), but his 
comments hardly move beyond a reaffirmation of natural male superiority. Moreover, 
he admits that the very notion of “passive citizenship” “seems to contradict the concept 
of a citizen as such” (MM 6:314). But this does not motivate him to apply his own 
republican principles to the internal organization of the family or the legal status of 
women. His claim in the Anthropology that when two people unite one must be 
subordinated to the other (see above) contradicts his account of the freedom and 
equality of the citizens who are united in the republic (MM 6:314). 
In his moral theory, the characteristics he assigns to men, such as courage, 
appear as the virtues of human beings. These are qualities that—he there claims—all 
human beings ought to strive to realize fully and in a morally appropriate way. The 
female characteristics do not appear to mark potential human excellences, however, 
and what Kant calls “feminine virtue” is not moral virtue in the strict sense of his 
ethics.  
Kant repeatedly acknowledges that there are women whose conduct does not 
fit his characterization, such as women scientists. Rather than celebrating their 
exceptional accomplishments and calling for their civil and political emancipation, 
however, he describes them as aberrations (OFBS 2: 229–230; LA Parow, 25: 355; A 
7:307).3 He says that he “would rather not deal with such women,” and that, as a rule, 
“nature has put something into the man for which one will look in vain in a woman” 
(LA Parow 25: 355). The women he does praise are “upright women who, in connection 
with their household, laudably maintained a character suitable to their vocation” (A 
7:308).4  He praises womanly women, women who do their womanly duties.  
                                               
3 I thank Kate Moran for the reference to the Parow lectures. 
4 Mari Mikkola (2011:102) claims that in this sentence Kant gives an example of women acting on moral 
principles. But given the reference to “their household” and to “a character suitable to their vocation” 
rather than character simpliciter, this does not seem to be the case. Moreover, immediately following 
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§2.2. Racial Difference with and without Racial Hierarchy 
Whereas Kant attributes to women characteristics that contrast with those of men, 
while also asserting their equality, until the mid 1790s he explicitly describes the 
“yellow,” “Negro,” and “copper-red” races as having increasingly serious deficits 
compared to “whites” and as lacking the capacity to govern themselves. On this basis, 
Kant defends white colonial rule over the rest of humankind, including the 
exploitation of non-white slaves. (It is worth noting here that Kant does not restrict 
the original region of “whites” to Europe but includes Africa north of the Sahara and 
large parts of Asia, see DCHR 8:92.)  
Kant portrays whites as occupying the highest rung of the racial ladder and as 
entitled to give laws to all other parts of the world. In his 1782 lectures on Physical 
Geography, Kant claims that the peoples of India would be much happier under 
European rule (LPG Doenhoff, 178–178’). In drafts of his anthropology lectures, he 
notes that “Americans and Negroes cannot govern themselves. Thus, [they] serve only 
as slaves” (R 15:878). In the lectures, he is reported as having said that [Native] 
Americans are the lowest of the four races because they are weak and incapable of 
being educated. He places Negroes above them because they can be trained to be slaves 
(but are incapable of other forms of education), and he remarks that although the 
inhabitants of India can be educated, this does not extend to the use of abstract 
concepts (LA Menschenkunde, 25:1187), and hence they are incapable of being 
magistrates (R 15: 877). Kant also refers to this hierarchy in his published works, such 
as the 1788 essay “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” which 
appeared just months after the Critique of Practical Reason (UTP 8:176). 
Kant’s discussions of chattel slavery until the mid-1790s are strikingly matter-
of-fact.5  He reports on the types of slaves needed for various types of labor (VRM 
                                               
this passage, Kant gives several examples of men (Milton, Socrates) who displayed “masculine virtue” 
when faced with unlawful or dishonorable requests from their wives, and who did so “without 
diminishing the merit of feminine virtue” (A 7:308; where Kant also presents Milton’s rather 
condescending response to his wife). 
5  By “slavery” I mean chattel slavery. Kant distinguishes this from slavery imposed as criminal 
punishment. In the Doctrine of Right, he argues that this punishment is permissible within (very wide) 
limits and as long as it is imposed only on the person who committed the crime (MM 6:329–330). 
Presumably he refers to the use of prisoners for forced labor, but in this paper I leave this issue to the 
side. 
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2:438n.), endorses an anti-abolitionist tract (UTP 8:174n.), and remarks that Negroes 
“seem to be made to serve others” (LA Ko 363) and “were created for” the harsh labor 
conditions on the so-called [Caribbean] “Sugar Islands” (LPG Dohna, 421). The 1780s 
lecture transcripts include passages such as the following: 
 
The Mandinka are the very most desirable among all Negroes up to the Gambia 
river, because they are the most hardworking ones. These are the ones that one 
prefers to seek for slaves, because these can tolerate labor in the greatest heat 
that no human being [Mensch] can endure. Each year 20,000 of this Negro 
nation have to be bought to replace their decline in America, where they are 
used to work on the spice trees … One gets the Negroes by having them catch 
each other, and one has to seize them with force. (LPG Doenhoff: 189) 
 
Note in this passage the implicit contrast between “slave” and “human being” and 
Kant’s adoption of the perspective of the slave owner when explaining to his students 
which kinds of slaves “one prefers” and which “have to be bought.” 
 In the middle of the 1790s, however, not long before the publication of Toward 
Perpetual Peace, Kant abandoned the thesis of racial hierarchy and white superiority. 
In contrast to his earlier characterization of Native Americans as weak, for example, 
he now calls them courageous, on a par with medieval European knights (TPP 8:365). 
Whereas he had previously described conditions on the “Sugar Islands” without any 
hint of criticism, merely educating his students on the use of these territories for 
European profit, he shifts to being a vocal critic of colonialism and slavery. In Toward 
Perpetual Peace Kant writes: 
 
The worst of this (or, considered from the standpoint of a moral judge, the best) 
is that they [viz., the European states] do not even profit from this violence; that 
all these trading companies are on the verge of collapse; that the Sugar Islands, 
this place of the cruelest and most calculated slavery, yield no true profit. (TPP 
8:359) 
 
Importantly, not only does Kant begin to criticize colonialism and slavery, but he 
simultaneously adds a new category of public right to his legal and political theory. 
This is the category of “cosmopolitan right.” Cosmopolitan right grants full and equal 
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juridical status to all humans—to all “citizens of the earth” (Erdbürger, MM 6:353). It 
covers relations between states and foreign individuals or groups, including non-state 
peoples. Among other things, cosmopolitan right prohibits states from imperialist 
intrusion. No one has a right to settle land used by others, except when expressly 
permitted through a treaty (TPP 8:358–359). Kant appeals to this new type of right 
when he condemns European colonialism and slavery. He calls the “trade in Negroes” 
a grave violation of their cosmopolitan right (R 23:173–174). He sharply criticizes the 
fact that the inhabitants of “America, the Negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, 
etc.,” were treated as ownerless things and “displaced or enslaved” by the Europeans 
(TPP 8:358; R 23:173–174). He now strongly condemns the founding of colonies by 
annexation, mentioning territories of “American Indians, the Hottentots, and the 
inhabitants of New Holland” as examples (MM 6:266). Instead, he now expresses the 
hope that “remote parts of the world can establish relations peacefully with one 
another, relations which ultimately become regulated by public laws and can thus 
finally bring the human species ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution” (TPP 
8:358). 
The fact that Kant abandons the racial hierarchy of intellectual and agential 
capacities does not, however, mean that he also drops the notion of race as a 
physiological concept. He retains this as a biological notion, but he no longer argues 
that the physiological differences between the races are associated with differences in 
their capacities for thought and action. Accordingly, he emphasizes that racial 
differences are irrelevant to his project in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View (1798) since they have no bearing on action (A 7:120; cp. A 7:320). And indeed, 
the Anthropology no longer offers—as his earlier lectures on the subject had—an 
account of the different “characters” of the races (A 7:320–321).  
 
§2.3. Where Hierarchies Intersect 
The two previous sections discussed Kant’s sexism and racism separately, and it is 
important to do so, if only to show the difference between Kant’s characterization of 
women in terms of a contrast with men and his characterization of the races in terms 
of the deficits of non-whites (“non-white” being an appropriate expression indeed in 
this context). With this said, separate discussion of racism and sexism presents only 
part of the picture. They intersect: they exist simultaneously, and this is evident in 
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Kant’s description of each.6 “The woman” described in the Anthropology is clearly not 
a “yellow, black, or red” slave living in a European colony; she has her “own 
household,” and this is not a corner in the slaves’ quarters. “The family” described in 
the Metaphysics of Morals is a single household with one married heterosexual 
couple, their offspring, and their male or female dependent servants (MM 6:282–
283), not the extended family common in many regions outside of Europe.  
 Conversely, when Kant defends the racial hierarchy, he describes the 
deficiencies of the “yellow, black, and red” races in terms of their lack of qualities that 
he attributes to white men. As we saw, he claims that other races cannot govern 
themselves, that they lack courage, and that some lack physical strength—these are all 
weaknesses that he also attributes to all women. Similarly, after Kant discards the idea 
of a racial hierarchy, he begins to attribute “courage” to Native Americans (TPP 8:365), 
a characteristic that he then still claims women are lacking. In other words, “the” 
Native Americans he describes are men. 
Kant does not thematize the different ways in which the intersection of various 
hierarchies and forms of subordination impact those involved. As a result, important 
questions remain unaddressed. Let me mention just one example. Kant writes: “When 
I make a contract with a servant, he must also be an end ... and not merely a means. 
He must also want it.” (FLNL 27:1319). Kant further argues that a servant ought to 
obey the head of the household but should have the right to cancel the contract (MM 
6:283). Although he explicitly includes both “male and female servants” in the 
household (ibid.), he does not discuss whether a female servant has a right to enter or 
cancel the contract on her own, or whether this must be done by—and hence with the 
approval of—her male “Herr,” guardian, and representative (e.g., her husband, her 
father). Presumably, Kant’s position is the latter since he defends women’s civil 
dependence and writes that the contract is between the (male) head of the household 
(Hausherr) and “free persons” (ibid.). But nowhere does he discuss the normative 
principles that govern the guardian’s conduct in such cases, that is, the conditions 
under which he ought to give approval to a female charge who wishes to terminate her 
job. Nor does Kant thematize the compounded dependence of female servants in the 
household—let alone that of female servants of color. 
                                               
6 Black feminist theorists have long pressed this point. See Crenshaw, 1989; Davis, 1982; Hooks, 1984; 
Collins, 2000. For more recent discussions, see Alcoff, 2006; Collins and Bilge, 2016. 
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In sum, by examining Kant’s account of the races in light of his sexism, and by 
examining his account of the sexes in light of his racism, we can expose implicit 
assumptions in each that might otherwise go unnoticed.  
 
§3. Inconsistency, Inegalitarianism, and Race-Neutral and Gender-
Neutral Language 
With regard to his racism and sexism, there is debate over the question of whether 
Kant is best seen as an inconsistent egalitarian or a consistent inegalitarian. The 
motivation behind this debate is not so much to determine whether it is possible to 
“save” our dear Kant from inconsistency but rather to determine whether it is possible 
to use Kant’s principles to criticize his biases. After all, if Kant’s prejudice contradicts 
his principles it seems much easier to shed the first and retain the second than if they 
form one coherent set of beliefs. 
Some authors argue that Kant was a consistent inegalitarian. Charles Mills, for 
one, suggests that Kant’s sexism and racism are clear indications that his moral theory 
is meant to apply only to white men, despite the seemingly inclusive terminology in 
which it is articulated. Mills argues that Kant saw only white men as “humans” in the 
full sense and that he meant the Categorical Imperative to apply only to white men. All 
others were, to Kant, inferior beings, Untermenschen or sub-persons: biologically 
human but below the threshold of full personhood on a par with white men (Mills, 
2005). On this view, it is impossible to use Kant’s principles against his biases since 
Kant’s principles themselves carry the bias. As Mills puts it: “the racist texts are part 
of his theory, not contradictions to it,” and “race in a racist sense is central to his 
thought” (Mills, 2019, 31-32; see also Eze, 1994; Bernasconi, 2001). Mills argues that 
we should “translate” Kant’s principles:  
 
In my opinion, there is no “tension” here, and putatively universalist Kantian 
egalitarian proclamations really need to be translated as restricted in their 
scope to the white male minority. (Mills, 2019, 34) 
 
 Others argue that Kant should be considered an inconsistent egalitarian. They 
maintain that his hierarchical views on the sexes and races contradict his moral and 
political principles. As a consequence, they argue, we can and should focus on the 
principles and leave Kant’s racist and sexist comments to the side. In this vein, David 
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McCabe has recently argued that Kant’s views on race are “not worthy of our serious 
attention” and that “our eyes should be on Kant’s moral theory” (McCabe, 2019, 7; cf. 
Louden, 2000, 105). He writes: 
 
[I]t is not clear why we should be interested in someone’s views except where 
they seem likely to be philosophically significant and fruitful, and Kant’s views 
on race are certainly not that. (McCabe, 2019, 7) 
 
Similar views have been defended with regard to Kant’s sexism. Mari Mikkola has 
argued that in those cases where Kant’s views on women are inconsistent with his main 
claims about the use of reason, they should “be bracketed off” or “put to one side” 
(Mikkola, 2011, 105, 107).7  
McCabe argues that the “logic” of Kant’s moral theory is “at odds with other 
views he had endorsed” and that “Kant’s developed moral theory is unambiguous in 
asserting equal status for all rational beings” (McCabe, 2019, 7). In other words, 
McCabe justifies his claim that Kant’s racism contradicts his egalitarianism by 
appealing to the fact that his moral principles are articulated race-neutrally.  
In light of Mills’s challenge, however, the view that Kant is an inconsistent 
egalitarian requires more argumentation than a mere reference to the race-neutral and 
gender-neutral terms in which his principles are formulated. Mills asserts that Kant 
assumes that only white men are “humans” in the full sense and hence that Kant 
restricts the applicability of the Categorical Imperative to white men. It does not 
suffice to respond that the Categorical Imperative must apply to all women and to all 
men of color too (“yellow, black, and red” and “mixed”-race) because Kant writes that 
it is valid for all humans. After all, what is required for showing that Kant grants equal 
status to women and men of all races is proof that he attributes to women and non-
white men those qualities that he claims are required for counting as human in the full 
sense. 
 Now one might believe that establishing this is easier in Kant’s case than in the 
case of philosophers who wrote in English. Kant wrote in German, and unlike English, 
where “man” means both “human being” and “male individual,” German has a 
                                               
7 She also argues that Kant’s views on women are not as dim as they are usually made out to be, Mikkola, 
2011; see also Varden, 2017.  
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separate word for each. “Mensch” means “human being,” and “Mann” means “male 
human being.” Hence it might seem that whenever Kant makes claims about 
“Menschen,” we can safely assume that they apply to both sexes and all races 
distinguished by Kant. Helga Varden has recently defended this view, adding that it 
seems “somewhat unfair” to “accuse Kant … of saying one thing while meaning 
something else entirely” (Varden, 2017, 683–684).  
The relevant texts make clear, however, that things are more complicated. As 
far as race goes, the passage quoted above in which Kant discusses the Mandinka is a 
case in point. Here Kant asserts that “no human being” (Mensch) can allegedly stand 
the heat, but that the Mandinka can. Here, “Mensch” clearly does not refer to the 
Mandinka, although there is no doubt that Kant regarded them as belonging to the 
human species. Apparently, however, not everything that Kant predicates of “humans” 
also holds for “Negroes” (just as not everything Kant predicates of the races applies to 
their female members, see section 2 above).8 Whether general terms are indeed used 
in this way can be determined only on the basis of their context. 
The same point applies in the case of sex and gender. There are many passages 
in which Kant moves back and forth between “Mensch” and “Mann.” Consider this 
claim from the Critique of Practical Reason: “There are cases in which human beings 
[Menschen] show from childhood … early wickedness and progress in it … 
continuously into their manhood” [Mannesjahre] (CPrR 5:99–100). Similarly, the 
“children” [Kinder] of a household eventually become “their own masters” [ihre eigene 
Herren] (MM 6:282). Thus, we cannot validly infer from Kant’s use of the general term 
“Mensch” that he includes all humans in its scope. 
This phenomenon is of course by no means peculiar to Kant. In the years after 
the 1789 declaration of the “rights of man and citizen,” Olympe de Gouges in vain 
claimed “human” rights for women, and she died under the guillotine. Some 
particularly interesting examples are found in high-profile legal cases. Nineteenth-
century Dutch laws concerning citizenship and voting rights were formulated in 
gender-neutral language, in terms of “Netherlanders” having to fulfill certain 
requirements (such as paying a certain amount of taxes). In 1883, Aletta Jacobs, the 
                                               
8 Whether Kant expressed this sentence exactly in these words when he gave his lecture does not matter 
for the purpose of my argument. My point here is general and applies both to the person who 
transcribed the lecture and to Kant. 
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first Dutch woman to satisfy the requirements, was nevertheless denied the right to 
vote, even by the Dutch High Council (the supreme court of the Netherlands). The 
court’s reasoning was that the terms “Netherlander” and “subject” here had to be 
understood as referring to men only, “because were this not the case … it would 
undoubtedly have been stated clearly and unequivocally.”9 In other words, the gender-
neutral terms should not be assumed to apply to women, for if they did apply to 
women, this would have been explicitly mentioned. In a similar case, the Canadian 
Supreme Court came to the same conclusion.10 
These supreme courts used as their principle the exact opposite of the idea that 
gender-neutral terms such as “Mensch” and “Netherlander” should be assumed to 
include both men and women. This is important to keep in mind when we twenty-first 
century readers approach historical texts. In many contexts, the general term should 
be assumed to exclude women unless indicated otherwise. This does not mean, of 
course, that women are always excluded—Aletta Jacobs did have to pay her taxes. But 
whether women are included or excluded can be determined only by reference to the 
background assumptions and wider context in which the general terms are used. 
Nevertheless, the gender-neutral and race-neutral terminology creates a gap or 
tension between the “neutral” wording of principles and their application as restricted 
by unstated assumptions. Precisely this tension made it possible for Olympe de Gouges 
and Aletta Jacobs to appeal to the general terminology in claiming women’s rights. 
Kant produces a similar tension between the general wording of his highest principles 
and the tacitly assumed restrictions that become visible only in their application. At 
the same time, given the general terminology in which he articulates these principles, 
their scope as stated extends well beyond his own restrictive construal of their 
application. 
Because of this built-in tension in Kant’s principles (and in the theory he 
develops on their basis), we can use these principles to criticize Kant himself and say 
that Kant “violates his own principles.” We could not do this were we to follow Mills’s 
suggestion and “translate” Kant’s formulations into the language of white male 
superiority. Nor, I should add, could Mills develop his own version of black radical 
                                               
9 Weekblad van het regt 4917, 7 August, 1883, p.1. 
10 As mentioned by Richard Rorty, 1990, 5, n.6 
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Kantianism on the basis of the resulting white male supremacist theory. Mills, too, 
makes use of the critical potential implicit in Kant’s general formulations (Mills 2018). 
 The built-in tension in Kant’s race and gender-neutral-worded theory also 
makes it possible to argue that Kant is inconsistent at least in important respects. If 
we take the principles as stated, abstracting from the unstated assumptions that 
restrict their application, then we can show, for example, that Kant’s Formula of 
Humanity contradicts his condoning non-white slavery. The argument can go as 
follows. Per definition, all human races share the essential characteristics common to 
all humans as such, and Kant explicitly says as much in the context of his 1785 essay 
on race:  
 
Properties that belong to the species itself in its essence, and which are hence 
common to all human beings as such, are inevitably hereditary; but because 
human beings do not differ with regard to these properties, these will be kept 
out of the discussion of the subdivision of the races. (DCHR 8:99) 
 
Furthermore, Kant argues that the essential characteristics common to all humans as 
such include their rational nature. He also justifies the prohibition against using others 
merely as means in terms of humans’ rational nature, or even simply in terms of their 
being human (G 4: 429–430). People who use other human beings as slaves use them 
as mere means. Hence Kant’s condoning of non-white slavery contradicts his own 
prohibition against using other humans merely as means. 
The fact that such contradictions can be pointed out, however, by no means 
implies that we can “remove and set aside” Kant’s racism and sexism. The 
contradiction is generated by abstracting from the racist and sexist assumptions 
guiding their application. Kant does not apply the principles in an egalitarian way, and 
we should not lose sight of that fact when we focus on his race-neutral and gender-
neutral formulations. It would be very odd to assume, say, that Kant would seriously 
defend genuine racism during his 1787 Physical Geography and Anthropology classes 
but would seriously defend genuine egalitarianism before and after class while 
working on his Critique of Practical Reason. We would have to imagine him switching 
back and forth between opposing positions on the same day, each day. Furthermore, 
simply setting aside his sexism and racism ignores how they influence his ethics and 
political theory more broadly, as I will argue in the next section.  
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What we need, therefore, is a middle position: we should acknowledge the 
tension between the general phrasing of Kant’s principles and the unstated restrictions 
in their application. If we translate the Categorical Imperative into a principle for white 
males, we lose one side of this tension; if we remove and set aside Kant’s racism and 
sexism, we lose the other.  
 
§4. How to Avoid Distortions and Replications of Kant’s Sexism and 
Racism    
McCabe and many others assume that if Kant can be shown to be inconsistent in the 
sense that his racist and sexist biases contradict his philosophical principles, we can 
turn our philosophical focus solely to his egalitarian theory as the only thing that is 
philosophically significant and fruitful. I would now like to show, on the basis of the 
results of the previous sections, that this assumption can become highly 
counterproductive. 
 
§4.1. The Dangers of Inclusive Language and Female Pronouns  
If we focus on Kant’s egalitarian-worded principles while disregarding his sexual and 
racial hierarchies, there will be a strong temptation to use inclusive language in our 
discussions. After all, if Kant’s principles are egalitarian (and contradicted by things 
he says about gender and race), then why not use inclusive language in our discussion 
of them? 
The use of explicitly gender-inclusive language, and even the exclusive use of 
female pronouns in discussions of Kant’s ethics and political philosophy, has indeed 
become customary in recent years. The intentions behind this change are laudable, but 
the practice is nevertheless problematic. 
The first problem is that of misrepresentation. If we focus on Kant’s principles 
while abstracting from his objectionable views on racial and sexual hierarchy, we risk 
depicting Kant as defending claims that he did not defend, or even as defending claims 
he actively argued against. Let me develop one example. 
Consider the “innate right of freedom,” as formulated in the Metaphysics of 
Morals, in some more detail: 
 
“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar 
as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal 
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law, is the only original right belonging to every human being [jedem 
Menschen] by virtue of his humanity [Menschheit].” (MM 6:237) 
 
This innate right underlies much of Kant’s political philosophy. In order to realize and 
secure this right to freedom, he argues, citizens ought to unite and collectively give 
themselves the laws they ought to obey (MM 6: 313–314; 340–341), for if the laws are 
their own laws, then they are independent from being constrained by the choice of 
another. The contrast case is despotism. 
As formulated, this innate right is not restricted to males; indeed, Kant states 
explicitly that “every human being” has this right by virtue of his humanity. Yet Kant 
relegates women to civil dependence on their husbands or male guardians and to 
perpetual passive citizenship, meaning that they cannot take any part in legislating the 
laws they ought to obey. Assume, first, that our philosophical interest is in Kant’s 
principles: our interest is in the innate right to freedom, and we wish to abstract from 
Kant’s obsolete claims about the subordinate status of women, claims that are 
arguably in tension with his assertion of this “human” right. Then what? Then, when 
discussing the innate right, we should most certainly not write sentences such as the 
following: “Kant regards every citizen as entitled to cast his or her vote,” or “Kant 
argues that every servant has the right to cancel his or her contract.” He did not regard 
all women as entitled to the right to vote and to cancel contracts on their own. For the 
same reason, we should not say of Kant’s citizen that she has a right to independence, 
or of the status of a servant that she has the right to cancel her contract. Using inclusive 
language and female pronouns makes these sentences downright false. 
Now assume, alternatively, that our interest is in Kant’s sexism: our interest is 
in the way Kant justifies the subjection of women and their perpetual dependence, and 
we are aware of the gender-neutral language Kant uses when formulating the innate 
right to freedom. Then what? Then, discussing the “innate right to freedom,” we 
should not write that this is a right Kant argued to be innate to (economically 
independent) males alone. The reason is that describing the right in this way prevents 
readers from seeing the tension between Kant’s sexism on the one hand and the 
egalitarian wording of the innate right to freedom on the other. For the same reason, 
we should not follow Mills’s recommendation that we “translate” the Categorical 
Imperative. We should not write, for example: “According to the Categorical 
Imperative, white males ought to act only on maxims they can simultaneously will as 
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universal laws for white males.” There are tensions between Kant’s egalitarian 
principles and his claims about gender and race, and we should portray Kant as neither 
more nor less of an (in)egalitarian than he was. 
 
§4.2. Ignorance and the Danger of Inadvertent Replication 
A second danger, closely connected with the first, is that of self-incurred 
philosophical naiveté and the unintentional replication of elements of Kant’s theories 
that were developed under the influence of his racism and sexism. The use of inclusive 
language or exclusively female pronouns not only risks misrepresenting Kant’s 
position but also mutes signals that might otherwise encourage further critical 
philosophical scrutiny. By making Kant sound like a decent egalitarian, it makes it less 
likely that readers will recognize that his racist and sexist prejudices had a profound 
impact on the shape of his moral and political theory as a whole. 
Consider the issue of domestic labor. Kant assumed that within marriage, wives 
or servants would take care of such tasks. He did not problematize the gendered 
division of labor as a live philosophical issue that deserves discussion. If we now wish 
to use Kant’s political theory for our own philosophical purposes, we should do more 
than merely remove Kant’s essentialist descriptions of women’s character. We also 
need to dig up and problematize associated assumptions and consider the traces they 
have left. We need to rethink, for instance, Kant’s way of distinguishing between the 
private and the public spheres, his gendered conceptualization of what counts as labor 
and how various tasks should be divided among members of society, the status of 
servants as dependents in the household, Kant’s identification of human virtues and 
“masculine virtues” (and the omission of “feminine virtues”), and so on. If we do not 
do this, we risk reproducing elements that Kant originally introduced on the basis of 
sexist and racist assumptions, many of which remain implicit much of the time. 
Theorists who want to use Kant’s theory for present purposes must engage with 
Kant’s own racism and sexism, if only to avoid replicating their effects in their own 
work. These elements of Kant’s thought should not be regarded as mere items in the 
history of philosophy museum of bigotry. Dale Spencer and Susan Moller Okin have 
warned against the tendency in recent political theory to just “add women and stir.” It 
is equally important to guard against the related tendency to just “remove sexism and 
racism and set aside.” 
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 For an example of the type of theoretical remodeling that may be required, we 
can point to Kant’s own writings. Kant reworked his international political theory 
when he dropped the idea of white superiority. In Toward Perpetual Peace and the 
Metaphysics of Morals, he introduced a novel principle of public right, namely the 
“cosmopolitan right” mentioned above. This right specifically rules out colonial 
conquest and explicitly attributes full juridical status to humans on all continents 
(although, again, he still simultaneously defended the subordination of women). In 
other words, Kant not only removed any talk of a racial hierarchy but also added 
something new to his theory of public right as a necessary adjustment. 
 This is not to say that Kant went far enough in making adjustments to overcome 
his earlier racism. As Peter Niesen (2014) has argued, Kant fails to consider the issue 
of restorative justice. Charles Mills (2018) has developed Kantianism further by 
incorporating key elements Afro-modern thought and experience. Elvira Basevich 
(MS) has expanded Kant’s model of public reason to develop a model of interracial 
civic fellowship. These are a few examples of transformations of Kant’s approach that 
go further than Kant did himself.11 
 Furthermore, we should make visible, in Kant’s work as well as our own use of 
it, the compounded effects of multiple forms of subordination. Kant discusses the 
“character” of the races and the sexes separately, but on closer inspection it turns out 
that his discussion of the races is in fact a discussion of the allegedly different 
characteristics of their male members alone. In order to recognize this pattern, we 
need to go beyond Kant’s discussions of race and examine his discussion of the sexes 
in relation to his discussion of race. Conversely, his characterization of women in the 
early anthropology lectures does not mention the deficits of “yellow, black, red” or 
“mixed”-race women, but this does not mean that it is race-neutral. 
 Thus, we should not take the structure of Kant’s theory as a given when using it 
for our current philosophical purposes, believing that we can simply set aside Kant’s 
objectionable views. We need to ask ourselves what further adjustments must be 
made. To be able to answer that question, we need to know exactly how and where his 
racism and sexism influenced his moral and political theory. 
                                               
11 Of course, one can also use Kant to move beyond Kant without focusing on the structure of his own 
theory, but rather by using it to tell us something about the nature of racism (Allais, 2016), or by using 
Kant’s notion of self-respect for purposes of feminist theory (Hay, 2013).  
SGIR Review                                                                          Volume 2, Issue 2 ⧟ Fall 2019 
20 
 In sum, if we want to use Kant’s work for current philosophical purposes 
without unwittingly reproducing some of his biases, we need to research his views on 
sexual and racial difference, reveal the unstated assumptions that guide his 
application of egalitarian principles, reconstruct the influence of these assumptions 
on the shape of his philosophical theories, and remodel these theories where 
necessary. 
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